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EYES WIDE SHUT: HOW IGNORANCE OF THE
COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE CAN
COMPROMISE INFORMED CONSENT
Katharine Traylor Schaffzin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Oscar Wilde said, "I can resist anything except temptation."'
Many clients may agree. They may be tempted to jump into a
common interest arrangement with strange bedfellows to gain the
advantages that information-sharing provides. Attorneys, nonethe-
less, must make sure that when they jump, their clients do so with
both eyes open.
The potential that the common interest doctrine may provide a
client with advantages in current litigation renders it a very attrac-
tive tool from a client's perspective. The common interest doctrine
is an evidentiary mechanism permitting independent clients with a
common legal interest to share attorney-client privileged informa-
tion with each other without waiving that privilege. Through
informal aggregation of common interests, an attorney represent-
ing one client assumes certain obligations to other members of a
common interest group, which members are represented by their
own attorneys, to advance the interests of her own client. The at-
torney achieves this by implementing a strategy advancing the legal
interests common to the group. Such aggregation may result in
faster, more efficient litigation because at least two parties are shar-
ing resources and information, obtaining results at a faster rate
* Katharine Traylor Schaffzin is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of
North Dakota School of Law. I would like to thank Meredith Miller and Sheila Scheuerman
for their helpful comments on this Article and their useful insights on the ideas expressed
therein. I also wish to thank Eeva Greenley for her excellent research assistance.
1. OSCAR WILDE, LADY WINDERMERE'S FAN 6 (Methuen 1985).
2. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 894, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244,
249 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243-44 (2d Cir.
1989)); Sedlacek v. Morgan Whitney Trading Group, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 329, 331 (C.D. Cal.
1992) (quoting In 7e Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, 902 F.2d at 249); Schachar v. Am.
Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 187,191-92 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Duplan Corp. v. Deer-
ing Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1175 (D.S.C. 1975); James M. Fischer, The Attorney-
Client Privilege Meets the Common Interest Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging
Information for Mutual Gain, 16 REv. LITIG. 631, 632 (1997). See infra Part IIA for a detailed
discussion of the common interest doctrine.
3. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, 902 F.2d at 249 (quoting Schuim-
met, 892 F.2d at 243); Sedlacek, 795 F. Supp. at 331 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 &
89-4, 902 F.2d at 249); Schachar, 106 F.R.D. at 191-92; Duplan Corp., 397 E Supp. at 1175;
Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 440-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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and for a lower cost.4 It may also lead to the discovery of otherwise
undiscoverable information useful to the client.
5
In addition to its potential advantages, informal aggregation
under the common interest doctrine also creates pseudo-attorney-
client relationships between the attorney for one client and the
other members of the common interest group-the "pseudo-
clients"-the boundaries of which are not clearly defined. These
pseudo-attorney-client relationships obligate the attorney to
consider the interests of pseudo-clients in addition to those of the
original client.7 Should the interests of the client and the pseudo-
client conflict in the future, the attorney may be required to
withdraw from representing the client, thus depriving the client of
his choice of counsel.'
4. Arnold Rochvarg, Joint Defense Agreements and Disqualification of Co-Defendant's Coun-
sel 22 AM.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 311, 312 (1998). See also, Schachar, 106 F.R.D. at 191-92; Joan K.
Archer, Joint Defense/Common Interest Privilege in Kansas, J. KAN. B. Ass'N, Feb. 2006, at 20, 20
("The privilege has been embraced because it provides great value to the adversarial system.
As one court explained, a joint defense provides defendants 'a pooling of resources, a
healthy exchange of vital information, a united front against a common litigious foe, and
the marshaling of legal talent and advice.'") (quoting Lugosh v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220, 236
n.10 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)); Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Impli-
cations of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DuKE L.J. 381, 386-88 (2000);
Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Howard M. Erichson, Modern Mass Tort Litigation, Prior-Action Deposi-
tions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 989, 1000 (1995) (quoting ATLA
Guide to Litigation Groups, TRIAL, July 1991, at S1, S2).
5. See infra note 25 for further explanation.
6. Courts in various jurisdictions disagree in defining the boundaries of the relation-
ship between an attorney and a pseudo-client. Compare Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v.
Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing that implied attorney-
client relationship may exist between attorney and pseudo-client); City of Kalamazoo v.
Michigan Disposal Serv. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 219, 232 (W.D. Mich. 2000), aff'd 151 F.
Supp. 2d 913 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (finding direct attorney-client relationship between attor-
ney and pseudo-client); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 993 E Supp.
241, 252-53 (D.N.J. 1998) (recognizing that an implied attorney-client relationship may
exist between attorney and pseudo-client); Ageloff v. Noranda, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 72, 75-76
(D.R.I. 1996) (same); GTE N., Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (finding implied attorney-client relationship between attorney and pseudo-client);
with Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 896 F. Supp. 651, 654 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (recog-
nizing that fiduciary relationship may exist between attorney and pseudo-client); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 395 (1995) (determining that no
attorney-client relationship exists between attorney and pseudo-client, although fiduciary
relationship may exist). See infra Part I.B for a detailed discussion of the relationship cre-
ated between an attorney and a pseudo-client and the boundaries thereof.
7. E.g., Abraham Constr., 559 F.2d at 253 (finding that attorney may owe to pseudo-
client all duties owed by attorney to client or some other fiduciary duty); Kalamazoo, 125 F.
Supp. 2d at 245 (finding that attorney owes to pseudo-client all duties owed by attorney to
client); GT N., 914 F. Supp. at 1581 (same); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibil-
it), Formal Op. 395 (noting that attorney may owe pseudo-client fiduciary duties). See infra
Part II.B for a detailed discussion of the obligations an attorney owes to a pseudo-client.
8. See infra Part 1II.B for a discussion of the possibility of attorney withdrawal and the
effects thereof on the client's choice of counsel.
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Consider, for example, the following scenario: Acme Develop-
ment Company and Beta Land Trust are real estate development
companies in the City of Xylon. Both Acme and Beta have signifi-
cant undeveloped land holdings within Xylon, which they plan to
develop in the future. Xylon has seized several acres of undevel-
oped land held by Acme, Beta, and others, under its eminent
domain powers. Acme and Beta believe that their land was seized
as part of a larger unconstitutional effort on the part of Xylon to
create a commercial development that would generate greater
taxes for the city than the undeveloped land currently garners.
Both Acme, through Attorney Arnot, and Beta, through Attorney
Bellows, have initiated separate claims against Xylon challenging
the takings. Attorneys Arnot and Bellows seek to cooperate with
each other by entering into a common interest agreement to more
efficiently develop their clients' separate actions against Xylon.
At this point in the hypothetical, there are only two attorney-
client relationships: the first, between Attorney Arnot and Acme,
and the second, between Attorney Bellows and Beta. Before enter-
ing into any concerted effort against Xylon, Attorneys Arnot and
Bellows owe only their respective clients the duties of diligence,
confidentiality, and loyalty.9 Attorney Arnot owes no duty to Beta as
a client and Attorney Bellows owes no duty to Acme as a client.' °
To further the interests of their respective clients through
pooled information, resources, and strategies, Attorneys Arnot and
Bellows enter into a common interest arrangement on behalf of
their clients to bring the independent claims of Acme and Beta
against Xylon. To enable such an arrangement, Attorneys Arnot
and Bellows obtain the written consent of their respective clients to
breach their duties of confidentiality. The parties exchange infor-
mation originally privileged under the evidentiary attorney-client
privilege and the ethical rule of confidentiality for the purpose of
enhancing the individual claims of their respective clients while
increasing the efficiency and decreasing the cost of the litigation.
At this point in the hypothetical, Beta may perceive the exis-
tence of an attorney-client relationship with Attorney Arnot and
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2003) (diligence); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003) (confidentiality of information); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2003) (conflict of interest: current clients).
10. Of course, Attorney Arnot owes Beta all the duties to which a third party is entitled
under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and likewise for Attorney Bellows and
Acme. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2003) (addressing attorney's duty
to remain truthful in statements to third parties); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2
(2003) (prohibiting attorney from directly contacting third party attorney knows to be rep-
resented by counsel); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2003) (obligating attorney
to correct any apparent misunderstanding of third party regarding attorney's role).
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Acme may perceive the existence of an attorney-client relationship
with Attorney Bellows. Under current law, it is unclear whether
such attorney-client relationships do, in fact, exist." It is clear, how-
ever, that Attorney Arnot will owe some duty to Beta after
exchanging confidential information under a common interest
arrangement, but there is no consensus across jurisdictions regard-
ing the scope of such a duty.2
Several commentators have attempted to define the duties owed
by an attorney to another member of a common interest group.13
Such discussions, however, overlook the effect that these new obliga-
tions on an attorney may have on her relationship with the original
client. Specifically, the potential conflict between the attorney's
duties to the client and her obligations to the pseudo-client in later
dealings may require the attorney to withdraw as the client's repre-
sentative if she is unable to fulfill her duties to both the client and
the pseudo-client. 4 The likelihood of such a disqualifying future
conflict is fact specific, as are the consequences of such a risk. To
many clients, the disqualification of the attorney that they have
come to trust and who has come to learn the intricacies of the
client's business may be a dire consequence of informal aggrega-
tion. 5 To any client, an attorney's disqualification at a critical point
in a legal matter may prove disastrous.' 6
11. See cases cited supra note 6. Part II.B, infra, contains a detailed discussion of the ex-
istence of an attorney-client relationship between an attorney and a pseudo-client.
12. See, e.g., Abraham Constr., 559 F.2d at 253 (finding that attorney may owe to pseudo-
client all duties owed by attorney to client or some other fiduciary duty); Kalamazoo, 125 F.
Supp. 2d at 245 (finding that attorney owes to pseudo-client all duties owed by attorney to
client); GTE N., 914 F. Supp. at 1581 (same); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prorl1 Responsibil-
ity, Formal Op. 395 (1995) (noting that attorney may owe pseudo-client fiduciary duties).
13. E.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 395 (rejecting
theory that joint representation creates attorney-client relationship with pseudo-client, but
recognizing that fiduciary and contractual duties may still exist); Mark P. Fitzsimmons &
Theresa Allyn Queen, Love Among Porcupines: Maintaining Healthy Relationships with Co-Counsel
in the Prickly Context of Complex Toxic Tort Litigation through Joint Defense and Joint Counsel Rela-
tionships, SL080 ALI-ABA 143, 165-70 (Jan. 26-27, 2006) (identifying theories that joint
defense agreement creates attorney-client relationship, imposes duty of confidentiality, or
imposes no duty); Bruce C. King & Carol J. Patterson, Reprsentation of Multiple Parties in the
Construction Arena: Ethical Issues, CONSTR. LAW, Fall 2005, at 5, 10-11 (proposing that joint
multiple party representations impose only duty of confidentiality on parties); Rochvarg,
supra note 4, at 344-45 (rejecting theory that joint representation creates attorney-client
relationship and proposing that such representation creates independent duty to pseudo-
client).
14. See infra Part III.B for a detailed discussion of potential attorney withdrawal or
disqualification posed by a common interest arrangement.
15. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of poten-
tial limitations on a client's choice of counsel.
16. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conse-
quences of attorney disqualification related to the timing of such disqualification.
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This Article addresses the novel ethical problems presented by
the common interest doctrine that implicate an attorney's duties of
diligence, confidentiality, and loyalty to his or her client. These ad-
verse effects of informal aggregation are not always fully
considered before engaging a client in a common interest ar-
rangement, but they should be. In Part II, this Article first explains
the potential advantages that the common interest doctrine pre-
sents as an evidentiary tool, but then recognizes that exercise of
the doctrine creates an undefined duty on the part of the attorney
to the party with whom a client exchanges confidential informa-
tion. Specifically, Part II.B warns that the common interest
doctrine creates some duty-ethical or fiduciary-owed by an at-
torney to a third party. Part III.A explains the effect that this
undefined obligation to other members of the common interest
agreement may have on an attorney's ability to provide her original
client with the representational rights to which he is entitled. In
Part III.B, the Article further explains that the relationship created
between an attorney and the other members of the common inter-
est group may so interfere with the attorney's ability to represent
her client as to require her to withdraw as counsel to the original
client. Finally, Part IV of this Article proposes that a broader dis-
cussion of the risks of the common interest doctrine, as well as an
individualized cost-benefit analysis, would serve to adequately in-
form a client of the risks associated with the common interest
doctrine.
II. AN ATTORNEY OWES AN UNDEFINED DUTY TO THE PSEUDO-
CLIENT UNDER THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE
A. The Common Interest Doctrine Offers Many Attractive
Advantages to Clients
Sharing information pursuant to the common interest doctrine
may appear very attractive to Acme and Beta from the above hypo-
thetical. Information-sharing provides clients with many advantages
in litigation including cost-savings, greater access to information,
and litigation strategies enhanced through collaboration. The evi-
dentiary mechanism by which Acme and Beta could exchange
privileged information is the common interest doctrine.17
17. Few jurisdictions have yet considered or recognized the concept of the common
interest doctrine. The courts in the following jurisdictions have not yet considered whether
to apply the common interest doctrine to protect attorney-client privileged communications
disclosed among plaintiffs or non-parties sharing a common legal interest: Alabama, Alaska,
FALL 2008]
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The common interest doctrine is an exception to the general
rule that the evidentiary attorney-client privilege is waived when
attorney-client privileged information is disclosed to third parties."8
The doctrine protects attorney-client privileged information dis-
closed in a confidential manner to third parties sharing a common
legal interest for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. 9 The doc-
trine typically applies whenever two parties share privileged
information to further a common legal interest, even if the parties'
interests are otherwise adverse. °
The purpose of the common interest doctrine is the same as that
of the underlying attorney-client privilege: to encourage open and
full communication between an attorney and his or her client, re-
Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. A number of states included in this list maintain attorney-client privilege statutes
that arguably protect communications shared among plaintiffs or non-parties, as well as
among co-defendants. See, e.g., ALA. R. EVID. 502 (b) (3), ALASKA R. EVID. 503 (b) (3); ARK. R.
EVID. 502(b) (3); IDAHO R. EVID. 502(b)(3); Ky. R. EvID. 503(b) (3); LA. R. EVID. 506(B) (3);
ME. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); Miss. R. EvID. 502(b)(3); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-503(2)(c) (2006);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 49.095(3) (2002 & Supp. 2004); N.H. R. EVID. 502(b) (3); N.M. R. EVID.
11-503(B) (3); N.D. R. EVID. 502(b) (3); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2502(B) (3) (West 1992);
OR. R. EVID. 503(2)(c); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-3(3) (Michie 1995); UTAH R. EvID.
504(b); VT. R. EvID. 502(b)(3); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.03(2) (West 2000). Those states are
included in the above list, however, because the courts within those states have not yet ap-
plied the respective statutes to protect communications shared among plaintiffs or non-
parties. Thus, the boundaries and consequences of the common interest doctrine remain
largely undefined. See generally Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why the
Common Interest Doctrine Does Not Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49,
65-68 (2005).
18. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4,John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 249
(4th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1989));
Sedlacek v. Morgan Whitney Trading Group, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 329, 331 (C.D. Cal. 1992)
(quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, 902 F.2d at 249); Schachar v. Am. Acad. of
Ophthalmology, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 187, 191-92 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Mil-
liken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1175 (D.S.C. 1975); Hanover Ins. Co. v Rapt &Jepsen Ins.
Servs., 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 (Mass. 2007); Fischer, supra note 2, at 632.
19. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, 902 F.2d at 249 (quoting Schwimmer,
892 F.2d at 243-44); Sedlacek, 795 F Supp. at 331 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 &
89-4, 902 F.2d at 249); Schachar, 106 F.R.D. at 191-92; Duplan, 397 E. Supp. at 1175; Hanover,
870 N.E.2d at 1109 (quoting Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 86); Fischer, supra note 2, at 632.
20. Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp., 471 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16 (D.D.C.
2007); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 ER.D. 407, 416 (N.D. I11. 2006); Visual Scene,
Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437, 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). It is this adversity
which sets the stage for future conflicts which may force counsel to withdraw. See, e.g.,
United States v. Moscony, 697 F. Supp. 888, 894 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Paul R. Rice, Joint Clients/
Participants in Joint or Common Defense, 1 ACPRIV-FED § 4:33 (2007). See infra Part III.B for a
detailed discussion of potential withdrawal by counsel.
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suiting in the most efficient and effective legal advice possible. 2' By
ensuring that a client's communications to his or her attorney will
remain privileged, the client should feel more comfortable reveal-
ing all relevant information to his or her attorney.2  The attorney's
ability to render the best legal advice is enhanced when he or she
23has greater access to the big picture .
Additionally, such aggregation may result in faster, more effi-
cient litigation. By pooling resources and information, all parties
involved may obtain results at a faster rate and for a lower cost.
24
Shared information may also lead to the discovery of otherwise
undiscoverable information useful to a party.' At the very least, the
end product of informal aggregation is more efficient litigation.
The hypothetical explained above provides a useful example of
the benefits of the common interest doctrine. Attorney Arnot repre-
sents Acme in its claim against the City of Xylon for its exercise of
eminent domain powers to seize undeveloped land owned by
Acme. Attorney Bellows represents Beta in a similar, but separate,
cause of action against Xylon. Attorneys Arnot and Bellows deter-
mine that they could more efficiently and effectively represent
their respective clients if they could share attorney-client privileged
information with each other. Absent the common interest doc-
trine, such an exchange would waive the attorney-client privilege
that Acme and Beta previously held.26 Under the common interest
21. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, 902 F.2d at 249; Visual Scene, 508
So. 2d at 440-41; Susan K Rushing, Note, Separating the Joint-Defense Doctrine from the Attarney-
Client Privilege, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1273, 1274 (1990) ("The joint-defense privilege fulfills the
social goal of encouraging interparty communications by preserving their confidentiality.
When several clients retain separate counsel, the litigation often requires cooperation
among the clients and their respective counsel if the clients are going to receive effective
legal representation." (footnotes omitted)).
22. See Duplan, 397 F. Supp. at 1175 (stating that the common interest doctrine is in-
tended to bring about client's objective freedom of mind in seeking out legal advice).
23. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) ("The lawyer-client privilege
rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's rea-
sons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.").
24. Fitzsimmons & Queen, supra note 13, at 146; Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 312.
25. See Lowenthal & Erichson, supra note 4, at 998-99. Of course, no client entering a
common interest arrangement can accurately assess the significance of these advantages
until he has entered such an arrangement and received information from another member
of the common interest group. Information shared under the common interest doctrine
must always be first protected by the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Sub-
poenas, 89-3 & 89-4, 902 F.2d at 249; Minebea Co. v. Pabst, 228 F.R.D. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2005).
Thus, an outside party cannot review such privileged material to determine its usefulness
until after he or she has accepted the terms of the common interest arrangement.
26. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir.
1997); United States v. Melvin, 650 E2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Megan-Racine Assocs.,
189 B.R. 562, 571 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 1036, 1047 (D. Del. 1985); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 ER.D. 595, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1981);
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doctrine, however, Attorneys Arnot and Bellows can engage in such
information-sharing while maintaining the protection of the un-
derlying attorney-client privilege. 7
In sharing such information, the parties can reduce the costs of
their respective claims and enhance their legal strategies. If Beta
shares with Acme the amount of taxes that it currently pays on its
land, for example, Acme need not conduct its own research to find
such useful information. The parties may also save by investing
jointly in the services of a single expert to value the land seized by
the City of Xylon and to calculate the projected taxes on the same
land once it is developed. Moreover, Acme and Beta may bolster
their legal strategies concerning the motives of Xylon in seeking to
develop a parcel of land much larger than the individual plots held
by Acme and Beta by openly discussing their separate legal claims.
The common interest doctrine, thus, offers both Acme and Beta
several potential advantages in their current claims against Xylon.
B. Defining an Attorney's Duty to Third Parties Under
the Common Interest Doctrine
Once an attorney enters into a common interest arrangement
on behalf of her client, she necessarily undertakes to provide some
service to the other members of the common interest arrange-
ment-the "pseudo-clients"-even though they are represented by
separate counsel. It is unclear precisely what such obligations en-
tail, as the law on this issue is split over whether the attorney has
entered into a second attorney-client relationship with the pseudo-
client or whether the attorney has simply assumed some fiduciary
obligation to the pseudo-client. 2 There is consensus, however, that
an attorney owes some duty to a pseudo-client.
29
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 386
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
27. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text for further explanation of how the
common interest doctrine maintains the attorney-client privilege even after such privileged
information is shared with third parties who comprise a common interest group.
28. See supra note 6.
29. E.g., Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th
Cir. 1977) (finding that attorney may owe to pseudo-client all duties owed by attorney to
client or some other fiduciary duty); City of Kalamazoo v. Michigan Disposal Serv: Corp., 125
F. Supp. 2d 219, 245 (W.D. Mich. 2000), affd 151 F. Supp. 2d 913 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (find-
ing that attorney owes to pseudo-client all duties owed by attorney to client); GTE N., Inc. v.
Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (N.D. 11. 1996) (same); ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 395 (1995) (noting that attorney may owe pseudo-
client fiduciary duties).
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In attempting to resolve disputes between attorneys and pseudo-
clients, various courts have questioned whether the pseudo-client is
a client under the law governing lawyers or whether the pseudo-
client is a third party.30 Those courts that have determined that the
attorney has created an attorney-client relationship with the
pseudo-client have required the attorney to extend to the pseudo-
client all the same ethical obligations owed to any other client.
31
Courts that have held that no attorney-client relationship exists
have gone on to determine that the attorney may nonetheless owe
some fiduciary duty to the pseudo-client. 32 Regardless of the theory
these courts applied, the determination was clear-an attorney
may unknowingly assume some obligation to a pseudo-client by
entering into a common interest arrangement for the benefit of
her original client.
33
1. Does the Pseudo-Client Become a Client?
One theory concerning the relationship between an attorney and
a pseudo-client holds that a pseudo-client becomes an attorney's cli-
ent where confidential information is exchanged pursuant to a
common interest arrangement. 34 This differs substantially from the
general rule that an attorney's ethical duties to a client commence
after the client requests the lawyer's representation and the lawyer
agrees to such representation.3  A determination that an attorney
has entered into an attorney-client relationship with a pseudo-client
30. See, e.g., supra note 6.
31. E.g., Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 245; GTE N., 914 F. Supp. at 1581.
32. E.g., Abraham Constr., 559 F.2d at 253 (finding that attorney may owe to pseudo-
client all duties owed by attorney to client or some other fiduciary duty); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Fornral Op. 395 (noting that attorney may owe pseudo-
client fiduciary duties).
33. E.g., Abraham Constr., 559 F.2d at 253 (finding that attorney may owe to pseudo-
client all duties owed by attorney to client or some other fiduciary duty); Kalamazoo, 125 F.
Supp. 2d at 245 (finding that attorney owes to pseudo-client all duties owed by attorney to
client); GTE X., 914 E Supp. at 1581 (same); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibil-
it); Formal Op. 395 (noting that attorney may owe pseudo-client fiduciary duties).
34. E.g., Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 231 (finding direct attorney-client relationship);
Ageloff v Noranda, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 72, 75 (D.R.I. 1996) (recognizing that attorney-client
relationship may be implied). The existence of an attorney-client relationship is determined
through application of substantive law and is a question of fact dependent on the circum-
stances unique to each relationship. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PREAMBLE AND
SCOPE cmt. 17 (2003).
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT PREAMBLE AND SCOPE cmt. 17 (2003). Notably,
however, an attorney's duty to maintain a client's confidentiality attaches to information
communicated from the moment "the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer
relationship shall be established" until the attorney either declines the representation or, if
accepted, until the representation is terminated. Id.
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may, thus, have surprising consequences on the attorney's conduct
toward her original client and the pseudo-client.
a. Recognizing an Attorney-Client Relationship
Several courts have recognized the creation of an attorney-client
relationship between an attorney and a pseudo-client engaged in a
joint defense or common interest consortium with the attorney's
client, reasoning that the existence of a joint defense or common
interest agreement may expressly or implicitly create such a rela-
tionship.36 Whether direct or implied, however, those courts agree
that such attorney-client relationships between attorneys and
pseudo-clients carry with them all the same ethical obligations of
any other attorney-client relationship.37
No court has yet considered whether a direct attorney-client re-
lationship may result between an attorney and a pseudo-client
through a common interest arrangement. Courts have, however,
considered the analogous issue whether a joint defense agreement
may create such a direct attorney-client relationship. 8 It is likely
that a court considering the issue under a common interest
agreement would also find a direct attorney-client relationship be-
tween an attorney and a member of a common interest group,
based on the similar purposes, goals, and structures of joint de-
39fense and common interest arrangements.
In City of Kalamazoo v. Michigan Disposal Service Corp., the United
States District Court for the Western District of Michigan found
that a direct attorney-client relationship formed between General
36. See, e.g., Abraham Constr., 559 F.2d at 253 (finding thatjoint defense agreement may
create direct attorney-client relationship, while behavior pursuant to such agreement may
imply such relationship); Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 233-34 (recognizing that joint de-
fense agreement may create implied or direct attorney-client relationship); GTE N., 914 E
Supp. at 1581 (finding that joint defense agreement created implied attorney-client rela-
tionship); cf., e.g., Essex Chem. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 993 F. Supp. 241,
253 (D.N.J. 1998) (remanding for review of language of joint defense agreement to deter-
mine existence of direct or implied attorney-client relationship); Ageloff 936 F. Supp. at 76
(ultimately finding no attorney-client relationship, but recognizing that joint defense
agreement may create express or implied attorney-client relationship).
37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
38. See Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 232. The common interest doctrine emerged as
courts considered whether the joint defense doctrine applied to attorney-client privileged
communications shared among civil co-plaintiffs or non-parties to advance common legal
interest. See Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 61. Many courts continue to refer to the common
interest doctrine as the "joint defense privilege," even as applied to co-plaintiffs or non-
parties. Id. at 61 n.38.
39. See supra note 38 for a discussion of the roots of the common interest doctrine in
thejoint defense privilege.
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Motors's counsel, Dykema Gossett, and its pseudo-client, Brunswick
Corp., when GM entered into a joint defense agreement with
Brunswick.40 Dykema Gossett had previously represented GM in a
cost recovery action commenced in 1992 pursuant to the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act
(CERCLA) of 19804' brought by the City of Kalamazoo against GM
and Brunswick, among others. Eight years later, Dykema Gossett
undertook representation of plaintiffs the City of Kalamazoo and
the Cork Street Landfill Group in a similar action against ten de-
fendants, including Brunswick; GM, Dykema Gossett's former
client, was not a party to this second dispute. Brunswick moved to
disqualify Dykema Gossett as counsel to plaintiffs, citing a conflict
of interest.
44
In considering this motion, the court considered Brunswick's
argument that it had become Dykema Gossett's former client by
virtue of the relationship created when GM and Brunswick entered
into a joint defense agreement to retain common counsel and to
coordinate a common defense against the City of Kalamazoo in the
earlier case.45 The court examined the terms of the joint defense
agreement, which required its members and their counsel to
maintain the confidentiality of information shared among the
group.4 The agreement further included language expressly
stating that an attorney serving on a committee for the joint
defense consortium did not create an attorney-client relationship
with the other members of the consortium simply by serving on the
committee.4 ' The court noted, however, that the joint defense
agreement did not include any provision affirmatively stating that
no attorney-client relationship existed between common counsel,
as opposed to independent counsel serving on a committee, and
members of the consortium.
40. 125 F. Supp. 2d 219, 232 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2000). Pursuant to CERCLA, the City of Kalamazoo sought con-
tribution from GM to recover its costs of remediating a Superfund site. Kalamazoo, 125 F.
Supp. 2d at 223.
42. Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 223.
43. Id. at 220.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 223. Pursuant to the joint defense agreement, each member could opt out of
common representation and retain separate counsel on any matter. Id. at 224.
46. Id. at 223. The joint defense agreement included multiple, lengthy paragraphs im-
posing the duty of confidentiality on any member of the consortium and its counsel
receiving information shared by another member. Id. at 225-27.
47. Id. at 224. For the text of the joint defense agreement, see infra note 80.
48. Id. In fact, the court stated in dicta that the contract language effectively prevented
an attorney-client relationship from developing between independent counsel serving on a
committee for the joint defense and other members of the joint defense consortium. Id. at
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Having determined that the language of the joint defense agree-
ment left room for the creation of an attorney-client relationship
under certain circumstances, the court found that Dykema Gossett
performed the role of common counsel to the joint defense consor-
tium.49 As common counsel to the joint defense consortium, the
court recognized a direct attorney-client relationship between
Dykema Gossett and all members of the consortium, including
Brunswick.50 Because Brunswick was, thus, a former client of
Dykema Gossett, the court held that Dykema Gossett could not
then represent the City of Kalamazoo in a substantially related mat-
ter adverse to Brunswick 5' and granted Brunswick's motion to
disqualify Dykema Gossett.
52
Even where a direct attorney-client relationship is not expressly
created by contract, some courts have nonetheless held that an at-
torney may be bound by the ethical duties owed to a client where
an implied attorney-client relationship has developed between the
attorney and a pseudo-client. 53 An implied attorney-client relation-
ship may develop where the nature of the relationship between an
attorney and a pseudo-client, where the situation under which con-
fidential information is exchanged, and where the terms of the
agreement between an attorney and a pseudo-client create a fidu-
ciary obligation on the attorney's part. 54 Where such a relationship
is found to exist, an attorney is bound by all the duties an attorney
owes to a client.5
In GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Products Co., the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois found an implied
attorney-client relationship between GTE North, Inc., and attorney
Jon Faletto, counsel to Dean Foods Company, by virtue of the ex-
change of confidential information pursuant to a common interest
agreement.5" The court precluded Faletto and his firm from repre-
senting Dean in its action adverse to GTE .
233. See infra Part II.B.L.b for a more detailed discussion of the court's dicta on the issue of
independent counsel.
49. Id. at 227.
50. Id. at 231, 238.
51. Id. at 245.
52. Id. at 242-43.
53. GTE N., Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (N.D. Il1. 1996).
54. Id. at 1580-81; George S. Mahaffey, Jr., Al for One and One for All? Legal Malpractice
Arising from Joint Defense Consortiums and Agreements, The Final Frontier in Professional Responsibil-
ity, 35 ARIz. ST. L.J. 21, 33, 38 (2003); see also Kalamazoo, 125 F Supp. 2d at 231, 234; Essex
Chem. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 993 F. Supp. 241, 253 (D.NJ. 1998). But see
Ageloffv. Noranda, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 72, 76 (D.R.I. 1996).
55. GTE N., Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 . Supp. 1575, 1579 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
56. Id. at 1581.
57. Id.
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Prior to initiating suit against Dean, GTE entered into a joint
remedial cost-sharing agreement with several other parties deemed
"potentially responsible parties" by the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, including Faletto's client, Chrysler, related to the
contamination of a Superfund Site." Under the cost-sharing
agreement, certain potentially responsible parties, including GTE
and Chrysler, agreed to pursue common actions against other po-
tentially responsible parties and to share confidential information
among the group which information would be held by each mem-
ber in confidence and the sharing of which was not intended to
waive the attorney-client privilege 9 Several members of the cost-
sharing agreement, including GTE and Chrysler, then entered into
a second agreement to share the common costs of investigating
unidentified potentially responsible parties. 60 The investigation's
coordinating counsel then disseminated confidential information
to all members of the group, including Chrysler's counsel,
Faletto.
61
When the investigation into other potentially responsible parties
concluded, Chrysler decided not to participate in any cost recovery
litigation and assigned its rights to GTE, which filed the action
against Dean Foods. Attorney Faletto then attempted to represent
Dean in its defense against the remaining plaintiffs, including
GTE."3 Chrysler, as Faletto's former client, consented to his repre-
sentation of Dean in GTE's cost recovery action. GTE moved to
disqualify Faletto, arguing that an implied attorney-client relation-
ship between Faletto and GTE existed.6 5 GTE further argued that
the implied attorney-client relationship created a fiduciary duty on
Faletto's part to maintain the confidences of GTE.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Il-
linois considered whether GTE was Faletto's former client, a
relationship that would require GTE's consent to waive the conflict
58. Id.
59. Id. In its statement of facts, the court stated that the agreement "included confi-
dentiality provisions which provided that all shared information between the members and
their counsel shall 'be held in strict confidence by the receiving member and by all persons
to whom such confidential information is revealed by the receiving member.' The agree-
ment further provided that the disclosure of such confidential information shall not
constitute a waiver of the attorney-client or work-product privilege." Id. at 1577.
60. Id. at 1577-78. The second agreement contained a confidentiality provision similar
to that in the first agreement. Id. at 1578.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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of interest.67 The court examined first whether a fiduciary duty ex-
isted, creating an implied attorney-client relationship, and second,
if an attorney-client relationship existed, whether Faletto violated
his ethical duty of loyalty to GTE by later defending Dean, an ad-
verse party, without obtaining GTE's consent.
68
The court determined that, where no direct attorney-client rela-
tionship exists, an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to maintain the
confidence of members of a common interest arrangement where
there is an actual exchange of confidential information 69 The
court further found that the language of the common interest
agreement clearly established the intent that all parties would
maintain the confidentiality and attorney-client privilege of all
shared information, which supported its determination that Faletto
undertook certain fiduciary obligations to GTE.70 Because the
court found an actual exchange of confidential information pursu-
ant to a common interest agreement from GTE to Faletto creating
a fiduciary relationship between them, it held that an implied at-
torney-client relationship had in fact existed between the two,
imposing upon Faletto all the ethical duties an attorney owes to his
client." Because this relationship could not be protected if Faletto
represented Dean, an adverse party, the court disqualified Faletto
from representing Dean Foods.
As evidenced above, several federal courts have held that an at-
torney-client relationship exists between an attorney and members
of a joint defense or common interest consortium, at least where
there is a finding that the attorney has received confidential in-1 3
formation. Those courts have imposed upon such attorneys all
the duties owed by an attorney to her client, including the duty of
67. Id. at 1579.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1580; accord Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d
250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977).
70. GTE N., 914 F. Supp. at 1581. But see, e.g., Essex Chem. Corp. v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 993 F. Supp. 241, 247, 251 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding no relationship between
attorneys for members of joint defense consortium and former client of attorney for an
individual member of that consortium where there was no actual exchange of confidential
information); Ageloff v. Noranda, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 72, 77-78 (D.R.I. 1996) (relying on
language of joint defense agreement to determine that attorney owed no duty to pseudo-
client).
71. GTE N., 914 F. Supp. at 1581.
72. Id.
73. E.g., City of Kalamazoo v. Michigan Disposal Sert. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 219, 233-
35 (W.D. Mich. 2000), affd 151 F. Supp. 2d 913 (W.D. Mich. 2001); GTE N., 914 F. Supp. at
1580.
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confidentiality, regardless of whether the attorney-client relation-
ship was classified as direct or implied.74
b. Ineffectiveness of Contract Provisions
As explained above, courts considering the language of a joint
defense or common interest agreement to determine whether an
attorney-client relationship exists between an attorney and another
member of a joint defense or common interest consortium have
found that contract provisions expressly denying the creation of an
attorney-client relationship may be effective in preventing the crea-
tion of a direct attorney-client relationship. Those courts have
also recognized that an attorney-client relationship may, nonethe-
less, be implied by the actions of the parties pursuant to that
agreement.
76
In Kalamazoo, discussed in detail above, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Michigan carefully
considered the provisions of the joint defense agreement between
the parties and, ultimately, determined that the language of the joint
defense agreement purporting to prevent the creation of an attor-
ney-client relationship between Dykema Gossett and Brunswick was
insufficient to do so. The court, however, reached its conclusion
after finding that Dykema Gossett acted as common counsel to all
members of the joint defense committee, rather than simply as an
independent member of the committee which would have been
protected by the terms of the contract.78 The joint defense agree-
ment required its members and their counsel to maintain the
79
confidentiality of information shared among the group and ex-pressly stated that an attorney serving on a committee for the joint
74. E.g., Abraham Constr., 559 F.2d at 253; Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 245; GTE N.,
914 F. Supp. at 1581. But see Essex, 993 F. Supp. at 247, 251.
75. See, e.g., Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 233; Ageloff 936 F. Supp. at 75-76.
76. See, e.g., Kalamazoo, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 234 ("Numerous authorities recognize that,
even where counsel are acting in ajoint defense situation on behalf of their own clients, the
circumstances of that representation may create an implied attorney-client relationship with
codefendants."); Ageloff 936 E Supp. at 76 ("It is true ... that in order to protect the ex-
change of confidential information, courts have held that an attorney who serves his or her
client's codefendant for a limited purpose becomes the codefendant's attorney for that
purpose.... Also, courts have recognized the existence of a 'fiduciary obligation' or 'im-
plied professional relation' between codefendants and their attorneys.").
77. 125 F. Supp. 2d at 233, 238.
78. Id. at 227.
79. Id. at 223. The joint defense agreement included multiple, lengthy paragraphs im-
posing the duty of confidentiality on any member of the consortium and its counsel
receiving information shared by another member. Id. at 225-27.
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defense consortium did not create an attorney-client relationship
with the other members of the consortium simply by serving on the
committee.8 0 The court noted in dicta that this language did serve
to effectively prevent the creation of a direct attorney-client rela-
tionship between members of the consortium and counsel acting
as independent members serving on a committee on behalf of the
consortium.8 ' Because the court found that Dykema Gossett per-
formed the role of common counsel to the joint defense
consortium, however, it recognized a direct attorney-client rela-
tionship between Dykema Gossett and the other members of the
812
consortium.
Although the district court recognized that the contract lan-
guage could effectively prevent the creation of a direct attorney-
client relationship, the court noted that such language could not
prevent the creation of an attorney-client relationship where the
conduct of the parties implied such a relationship. 3 The court fo-
cused on the fact that, during the course of the common defense,
the members of the consortium and their counsel, including
Dykema Gossett, exchanged confidential information.84 Thus, de-
spite the existence of contract provisions attempting to prevent the
creation of an attorney-client relationship, the district court recog-
nized that, had the court found no direct attorney-client
80. Id. at 224. The joint defense agreement stated:
No member, or representative, or counsel for any Member, has acted as counsel for
any other Member with respect to such Member entering into this Agreement, ex-
cept as expressly engaged by such Member with respect to this Agreement, and each
Member represents that it has sought and obtained any appropriate legal advice it
deems necessary prior to entering into this Agreement.
No Member or its representative serving on any committee or subcommittee shall
act or be deemed to act as legal counsel or a representative of any other [M]ember,
unless expressly retained by such Member for such purpose, and, except for such ex-
press retention, no attorney/client relationship is intended to be created between
representatives on any committee or subcommittee and the Members.
Id.
81. Id. at 233 ("With regard to those counsel merely participating in joint defense ac-
tivities on behalf of their respective clients, no attorney-client relationship attaches to any
other defendant."); see also Ageloff 936 F. Supp. at 75-76 (relying on language of joint de-
fense agreement to determine that attorney owed no duty to pseudo-client).
82. Kalamazoo, 125 E Supp. 2d at 223. The court found that the joint defense agree-
ment did not include any provision affirmatively stating that no attorney-client relationship
existed between common counsel (as opposed to independent counsel serving on a com-
mittee) and members of the consortium. Id.
83. Id. at 234.
84. Id. at 227.
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relationship, it very well could have recognized an implied attor-
ney-client relationship. 5
Because contract provisions attempting to prevent the creation of
an attorney-client relationship may be effective only to prevent the
creation of a direct, but not an implied, attorney-client relationship
and because the ethical obligations owed by an attorney to a pseudo-
client are identical regardless of whether an attorney-client rela-
tionship is deemed direct or implied,6 contract provisions such as
these have little practical effect. Should a court determine that
contract language successfully blocked the creation of a direct
attorney-client relationship, the court would, nonetheless, look to
the conduct of the parties to determine whether an implied rela-
tionship arose. Because the ethical duties owed to a client under
an implied attorney-client relationship mirror those owed under a
direct attorney-client relationship, an attorney would be ethically
bound to the pseudo-client even absent a direct relationship. Thus,
contract language attempting to prevent the creation of an attor-
ney-client relationship between an attorney and a pseudo-client is
ineffective to prevent the imposition of new ethical obligations
upon the attorney.
2. Does the Pseudo-Client Remain Just Another Third Party?
Although some courts have recognized an attorney-client rela-
tionship between an attorney and his or her pseudo-client, most
authorities treat the pseudo-client instead as a third party to whom
the lawyer may owe some contractual or fiduciary duties.8 ' Those
authorities first note that the mere participation in a common in-
terest consortium does not create an attorney-client relationship.8
These authorities recognize, however, that an attorney may owe a
fiduciary obligation to a client's co-defendant.8 Specifically, the
actual sharing of confidential information creates a fiduciary duty
85. Id. at 234-35.
86. E.g., id. at 245; GTE N., Inc. v. Apache Prods. Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (N.D. Ill.
1996).
87. Erichson, supra note 4, at 418; Essex Chem. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 993 F. Supp. 241, 252-53 (D.N.J. 1998).
88. Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 896 F. Supp. 651, 654 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Es-
sex Chem. Corp., 993 F. Supp. at 251; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal
Op. 395 (1995); Mahaffey, supra note 54, at 37.
89. Ageloff v. Noranda, Inc., 936 F Supp. 72, 76 (D.R.I. 1996).
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on the part of the attorney to maintain the confidentiality of the
pseudo-clientY0
The American Bar Association addressed this issue in the con-
text of a joint defense consortium in 1995." The lawyer requesting
the opinion of the ABA represented certain insurance companies
in litigation wherein up to thirty different insurance companies
were named defendants. 2 These defendants would routinely join
forces by forming a joint defense consortium, wherein the mem-
bers would execute a standard agreement which stated "that
lawyers for the constituent insurance companies do not represent
the other members of the consortium."9 The lawyer in question
had since left his firm and sought to represent a potential client in
a claim against members of the consortium other than the lawyer's
former clients.
9 4
At that time, the attorney requested the advice of the ABA as to
whether he would be precluded from representing parties adverse
to members of a joint defense consortium in which a former client
of the attorney had been a member.95 When the joint defense con-
sortium was originally formed, all members agreed in writing that
lawyers for the constituent companies in the consortium do not
represent the other members of the consortium. 6 Relying on this
provision in the agreement, the ABA concluded that such a lawyer
would owe no more than a fiduciary obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of any information exchanged. The ABA clearly
stated, however, that such a lawyer "would not ... owe an ethical
obligation to them, for there is simply no provision of the Model
Rules imposing such an obligation. '" 98
90. Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 654; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, For-
mal Op. 395; Mahaffey, supra note 54, at 36. In Turner, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas declined to disqualify an attorney based on a conflict of inter-
est, finding that no irrebuttable presumption that confidential information has been
exchanged arises absent a direct attorney-client-relationship. 896 E. Supp. at 653. Moreover,
the court determined that, absent an actual exchange of confidential information, an attor-
ney owes no fiduciary duty to a pseudo-client. Id. at 654.
91. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 395.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. In response to the lawyer's inquiry as to his relevant ethical obligations under
these circumstances, the ABA issued a formal ethics opinion concluding that "A lawyer who
has represented one, but only one, of the parties in a joint defense consortium does not
thereby acquire an obligation to the other parties to the consortium that poses an ethical
bar to the lawyer thereafter taking on a related representation adverse to any of the other
parties." Id.
98. Id. (emphasis in original).
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3. A Difference Without a Distinction
As explained in detail above, the approach of courts to the issue
of the attorney-pseudo-client relationship is varied. Whether courts
find that the relationship between an attorney and a pseudo-client
is a direct attorney-client relationship, an implied attorney-client
relationship, or a fiduciary relationship, the result is the same: an
attorney necessarily undertakes some additional ethical responsi-
bilities to the pseudo-client, including the duty of confidentiality.
Where courts have found either a direct or implied attorney-client
relationship, they have imposed upon the attorney with respect to
the pseudo-client all the same ethical responsibilities owed to the
original client.9  Those authorities that have instead found only a
fiduciary relationship between the attorney and the pseudo-client
have, at a minimum, imposed upon the attorney the fiduciary obli-
gation of maintaining the pseudo-client's confidence. 00 Whatever
the classification of the relationship, the end result will force attor-
neys to consider the interests of pseudo-clients in some capacity
that may impact the representation that the attorney may provide
to his or her original client.
III. THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE MAY FORCE THE CLIENT TO
FOREGO REPRESENTATIONAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING
HIS CHOICE OF COUNSEL
Defining the duties owed by an attorney to a pseudo-client is
certainly essential to understanding the rights and obligations of
both attorneys and pseudo-clients.'0 ' The issue, however, focuses on
99. See, e.g., City of Kalamazoo v. Michigan Disposal Serv. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 219,
245 (W.D. Mich. 2000), afr'd 151 F. Supp. 2d 913 (W.D. Mich. 2001); GTE N., Inc. v. Apache
Prods. Co., 915 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (N.D. Ill. 1996). See supra part II.B.l.b for a detailed
discussion of the similar ethical obligations owed to a pseudo-client under a direct or im-
plied attorney-client relationship.
100. Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 896 E Supp. 651, 654 (E.D. Tex. 1995);
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 395 ("[T]he lawyer's obliga-
tions to the party he represented may present such a bar, and the lawyer will almost certainly
have undertaken fiduciary obligations to the other parties that have the same effect.");
Mahaffey, supra note 54, at 36.
101. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 395 (re-
jecting theory that joint representation creates attorney-client relationship with pseudo-
client, but recognizing that fiduciary and contractual duties may still exist); Fitzsimmons &
Queen, supra note 13, at 165-70 (identifying theories that joint defense agreement creates
attorney-client relationship, imposes duty of confidentiality or imposes no duty); King &
Patterson, supra note 13, at 10-11 (proposing that joint multiple party representations im-
pose only a duty of confidentiality on parties); Rochvarg, supra note 4, at 344-45 (rejecting
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the protection of the pseudo-client from the attorney or the attor-
ney from the pseudo-client. In each case discussed above, for
example, the issue was the protection of the pseudo-client from a
perceived conflict of interest in a later case . Such a determina-
tion fails to consider the protection of the original client from such
potential conflicts.
The question that has not been asked is how the ethical or fidu-
ciary duties assumed by an attorney to benefit the pseudo-client
affect the attorney's ethical duties to her original client. To protect
the original client from the outset, an attorney must fully under-
stand and explain to the client the implications of assuming those
duties should the attorney's obligations to the client and the
pseudo-client ever conflict. Moreover, much has been written on
obtaining the informed consent of a client before waiving the duty
of confidentiality by entering into a common interest arrange-
ment,103 but few have considered the necessity of fully informing
the client of the potential conflicts of interest, and the conse-
quences thereof, caused by the attorney's assumption of duties to
the pseudo-client.
In many cases, a client who enters a common interest arrange-
ment effectively agrees to accept something less than the
confidentiality, diligence, and loyalty that the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Responsibility require an attorney to provide. To fulfill
her duties under the Model Rules, an attorney must consider the
effect of a common interest arrangement on her ethical obliga-
tions to her client, as well as to any third party, before entering into
such an agreement on behalf of that client. The most obvious ethi-
cal duty implicated by the common interest doctrine is that of
confidentiality. 10 4 Less obvious are the effects of the common inter-
est doctrine on an attorney's duties of diligence' 5 and loyalty.16 A
theory that joint representation creates attorney-client relationship; proposing that such
representation creates independent duty to pseudo-client).
102. See supra Part II.B for a detailed discussion of cases addressing the protection of
pseudo-clients from future conflicts of interest.
103. Erichson, supra note 4, at 386; Fitzsimmons & Queen, supra note 13, at 146-47;
David B. Leland, Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 598, 601 (2000); see also
Fischer, supra note 2, at 634 (stating that common interest doctrine allows co-parties to co-
ordinate strategies even outside of litigation context); Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in
Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 833, 903 (2005) (discussing client's informed consent
in context ofjoint defense agreement).
104. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of the
common interest doctrine on an attorney's duty of confidentiality.
105. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the implications
of the common interest doctrine on an attorney's duty of diligence.
106. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the common in-
terest doctrine's effect on an attorney's duty of loyalty.
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client must necessarily sacrifice some of his rights under the attor-
ney-client relationship to reap the benefits of information-sharing
made possible by the common interest doctrine.' 7
Under many circumstances, the informed consent of a client
may waive certain of these ethical duties. ' Unfortunately, com-
mentators and practitioners alike overlook the risks posed by the
common interest doctrine, as well as the severity of those risks,
when communicating the pros and cons of entering a common
interest arrangement. Without full disclosure of the risks posed by
the common interest doctrine, a client may unknowingly give up
more than he bargained for. Arguably, this could render the cli-
ent's consent uninformed, eviscerating the ethical basis on which
the attorney justified the abdication of her ethical responsibilities.
Absent informed consent or in a circumstance in which the con-
flict is non-consentable, the attorney must withdrawal her
representation.'0 9 Such withdrawal may substantially interfere with
a client's choice of counsel, resulting in significant harm."0 At the
very least, withdrawal will pose a mild to severe disruption in the
client's representation.
Returning to the earlier hypothetical, Attorney Arnot received
Acme's consent to breach her duty of confidentiality; she failed,
however, to obtain its consent to breach her duties of diligence and
loyalty. To fully inform Acme of the risks of entering into a com-
mon interest arrangement, Attorney Arnot would have to discuss
the implications of common representation, including the risk
that, should the interests of Acme and Beta later diverge, Attorney
Arnot's ethical or fiduciary duties to Beta may create a conflict of
interest forcing her to withdraw as counsel to Acme, denying it its
choice of counsel.
For example, Acme and Beta, as competing real estate develop-
ers in the same city, may very well be adversaries in a later attempt
to obtain the rights to develop a unique parcel of land. Attorney
Arnot's consideration of Beta's interests in the past may create a
conflict precluding her representation of Acme in its future actions
against Beta. Thus, there exists a strong possibility that embarking
on a common interest strategy, although at all times intended to
benefit Acme, may ultimately result in its harm. Acme may very
107. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the advantages of the common interest doc-
trine.
108. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the possibility of waiver of the duties of confi-
dentiality, diligence, and loyalty by informed consent.
109. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the possibility of attorney withdrawal.
110. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of the effects of attorney withdrawal on a cli-
ent's ability to select his or her own counsel.
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well determine that the harm posed by the potential withdrawal of
Attorney Arnot in future litigation is minimal. Attorney Arnot,
nonetheless, must obtain Acme's informed consent concerning the
potential conflict of interest between its interests and those of Beta
before entering the common interest arrangement.
A. Impact of the Common Interest Doctrine on an Attorney's
Ethical Obligations to the Client
The obligations incurred by an attorney on behalf of a pseudo-
client by virtue of the common interest doctrine may put an attor-
ney in a difficult ethical position. Many scenarios exist by which an
attorney's ethical duties to her client are directly challenged by her
obligations to the pseudo-client. The most commonly challenged
duties to a client will be those of confidentiality, loyalty, and dili-
gence.
Because the common interest doctrine necessarily involves the
divulging of confidential attorney-client privileged information,"'
the most obvious ethical duty implicated in a common interest ar-
rangement is an attorney's duty of confidentiality. Confidentiality is
at the heart of the attorney-client relationship.1 2 Courts uniformly
recognize the important purpose of the duty of confidentiality-to
encourage open and honest communication between attorney and
client.13 Confidentiality builds a client's trust in his attorney, thus
enabling the attorney to provide the best and most efficient legal
advice." 4 Good legal advice benefits not only the client, but the
courts and the public as well, by promoting justice and judicial ef-
111. See supra Part II.A for further explanation of the common interest doctrine.
112. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2003) ("A fundamental principle
in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client's informed consent, the
lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation.... This contributes to
the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship."); Douglas R. Richmond, The
Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated Confidentiality Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN
ST. L. REV. 381, 394 (2005); Patrick T Casey & Richard S. Dennison, The Revision to ABA Rule
1.6 and the Conflicting Duties of the Lawyer to Both the Client and Society, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
569, 569 (2003) ("Confidentiality is considered one of the most vital and fundamental at-
tributes of the attorney-client relationship.").
113. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); In re Grand Jury Subpoe-
nas, 89-3 & 894, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2; Richmond, supra note 112, at 395.
114. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389-91; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 ("The
client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly
with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer
needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the cli-
ent to refrain from wrongful conduct.").
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ficiency" 5 Thus, courts generally seek to protect confidential
communications as a matter of sound public policy.
1 1 6
The common interest doctrine, however, requires an attorney to
breach the important duty of confidentiality. To enter a common
interest arrangement with another, the client must necessarily con-
sent to the disclosure of confidential information to other
members of the commonly allied group. Essentially, this requires a
narrow waiver limiting disclosure of confidential information to
only those members of the common interest consortium."7
In addition to owing her client the duty of confidentiality, an at-
torney in a common interest arrangement assumes the obligation
to maintain the confidence of the pseudo-client as well."" This duty
may conflict with the original client's later desire to reveal such
information to advance his own cause. For example, the client may
later wish to use the confidential information shared by the
pseudo-client to enhance his position in settlement with a common
adversary, to introduce the confidential information as evidence, or
to cross-examine the pseudo-client at trial to enhance the client's
case. After the attorney assumes this obligation to the pseudo-client,
however, she is unable to use the confidential information to the
pseudo-client's disadvantage in this way because the new duties she
has assumed on behalf of the pseudo-client prevent her from doing
so. Moreover, if the parties' interests later diverge, the attorney re-
mains obligated to maintain the pseudo-client's confidence,
although her duties to maintain her own client's confidence as to
the pseudo-client have been waived.
Not only does the pseudo-client's confidentiality trump that of
the client, this duty to the pseudo-client may create a conflict be-
tween the attorney's duty of confidentiality to the pseudo-client
and her duties of loyalty and diligence to the original client. The
attorney's loyalty to her client is undermined by her new commit-
ment to the pseudo-client. Additionally, the attorney's ability to
pursue the client's interests with commitment and zeal is materially
limited by her conflicting duty-ethical or fiduciary-to maintain
the confidence of the pseudo-client.
115. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 ("[The attorney-client privilege's] purpose is to encourage
full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice."); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2.
116. See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; In re GrandJury Subpoenas, 89-3 & 89-4, 902 F.2d at
249.
117. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the use of informed consent to waive the duty
of confidentiality.
118. See supra Part II.B.3.
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An attorney's duties of loyalty, including independent judg-
ment"9 and the prohibition on accepting representation adverse to
12 ,121
a client,20 are also implicated by the common interest doctrine.
The purpose of the duty of loyalty and the corresponding prohibi-
tion on maintaining conflicts of interest is to protect the
lawyer-client relationship by precluding situations which could fos-
ter feelings in the client of betrayal by the attorney or beliefs that
the lawyer will pursue some interest other than the client's.'2 2 Such
feelings of distrust interfere with the attorney's ability to render
sound legal advice.
23
In addition to precluding representation of a party directly ad-
verse to his or her client, 124 the duty of loyalty also prohibits any
representation in which "there is a significant risk that a lawyer's
ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course
of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests.",125 Such a risk often ex-
ists where an attorney represents multiple parties in the same
action; the attorney's duty of loyalty to one client may foreclose an
option in the best interest of another client.126 Common represen-
tation creates additional potential for conflicts of interest
attributed "by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' tes-
timony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing
party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of
settlement of the claims or liabilities in question."'' 27 Despite this
conflict of loyalties, each client is entitled to the attorney's undi-
vided loyalty and diligence, as impossible as that task appears.128
119. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 1 (2003) ("Loyalty and independent
judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client.").
120. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6 (2003). A directly adverse conflict
may exist in several circumstances. The most obvious example of a direct conflict is where
an attorney seeks to represent one client in an action directly adverse to another client.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2003). An attorney is further precluded from
representing one client in a matter against a client whom the attorney represents in a wholly
unrelated matter. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6. Additionally, a direct
conflict exists where an attorney seeks to cross-examine a client resulting in harm to that
client while representing another client. Id. Because representing adverse parties in a direct
conflict of interest is likely to damage the attorney's relationship of trust with both clients,
Model Rule 1.7(a) (1) prohibits such representation.
121. This duty is so important that the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility de-
vote at least four rules aimed at prohibiting conflicts of interest that would interfere with an
attorney's duty of loyalty. SeeMODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RR. 1.7-1.10 (2003).
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 8.
126. Id.
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 23.
128. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 33.
[VOL. 42:1
Eyes Wide Shut
Such a conflict can arise in a common interest arrangement
where an attorney's duties of loyalty and independent judgment to
a client may be materially limited by the attorney's simultaneous
fiduciary obligations to a pseudo-client. 129 Returning to the earlier
hypothetical in which Acme and Beta have entered a common in-
terest arrangement in their separate claims against the City of
Xylon, Attorney Arnot's loyalty to Acme, as well as her independ-
ent judgment, are likely to be materially limited by her duty to
maintain Beta's confidence. For example, a situation may develop
where Acme may engage in settlement negotiations with Xylon.
Acme may benefit in its settlement with Xylon by disclosing to
Xylon confidential information shared by Beta with Acme in the
context of their common interest arrangement. Acme may wish to
disclose this information; nonetheless, Attorney Arnot would be
ethically prohibited from disclosing to Xylon confidential informa-
tion shared by Beta in the context of the common interest
arrangement. If Attorney Arnot refuses to disclose the information,
Acme is likely to call her loyalty into question.
Additionally, the common interest doctrine presents a challenge
to an attorney's duty of diligence. Diligence 3 0 requires an attorney
to hold her client's interests paramount and to act with commit-
ment and zeal on the client's behalf.131 When an attorney enters
into a common interest arrangement on behalf of her client, how-
ever, she faces the challenge of maintaining the client's interest as
paramount while necessarily agreeing to accept some obligation of
confidentiality on behalf of the other members of the common
interest arrangement. Returning to the earlier example, it would
be difficult for Attorney Arnot to hold the interests of Acme para-
mount while simultaneously protecting Beta from Acme's desire to
use Beta's confidential information to obtain a settlement favor-
able to Acme.
For all of the above reasons, the duties owed by an attorney to a
pseudo-client corresponding with the common interest doctrine
can significantly undercut the client's own entitlement to confi-
dential, diligent, and loyal representation.
129. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 9.
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2003) ("A lawyer shall act with reason-
able diligence and promptness in representing a client.").
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1. Diligence also requires that an at-
torney accept only representation he or she believes he or she can continue to its
conclusion. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 4. Because an attorney's ability to
represent a client to the conclusion of a legal matter is jeopardized by responsibilities to a
pseudo-client created by a common interest agreement, the risk of withdrawal further chal-
lenges an attorney's ability to honor her duty of diligence. See infra Part II1.B for further
discussion of potential withdrawal.
FALL 2008]
96 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
B. Uninformed Consent and the Hidden Danger of Withdrawal
As explained above, because the common interest doctrine bur-
dens an attorney with some obligation--ethical or fiduciary-to a
pseudo-client, such a duty jeopardizes an attorney's ability to pro-
vide confidential, diligent, and loyal representation to her client.
Her client may nonetheless determine that the perceived benefits
of entering a common interest consortium are so great that he may
be willing to forego his representational rights through waiver,
where permitted. For such a waiver to be effective, however, it must
be informed; if the client is not aware of all significant risks before
entering into the common interest arrangement, then he cannot
confer informed consent. His attorney must explain the many risks
of the common interest doctrine, including the risks to confidenti-
ality, diligence, and loyalty, as well as the overarching risk of
attorney withdrawal.
Obtaining a client's informed consent is only effective if the cli-
ent understands and appreciates the risks presented by the
conflict. - An attorney, however, need not disclose the risks of every
course of action and obtain consent whenever the "mere possibility
of subsequent harm" arises. 33 To determine whether to disclose
certain risks to gain consent, an attorney must evaluate "the likeli-
hood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does,
whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent
professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose
courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of
the client.' 34 Determining what information must be disclosed to
render a client's consent "informed" depends on the risks involved
in the given situation.3
Unfortunately, as played out in case law and in scholarly discus-
sions, many attorneys fail to obtain the informed consent of their
clients before entering into a common interest arrangement.
These shortcomings may arise from a failure to address either any
risk generally associated with the common interest doctrine or any
risk other than that associated with the immediate waiver of confi-
dentiality. Where consent falls short of being "informed," it is the
attorney who is left holding the bag: relying on consent later
deemed uninformed, an attorney may realize all too late that she
breached the ethical duties of confidentiality, loyalty, and diligence
132. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 22.
133. MODEL RuL.ES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 8.
134. Id.
135. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 18.
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in entering a common interest arrangement on behalf of her
client.
A client's consent may also be deemed uninformed if an attor-
ney fails to counsel her client on the risks of potential attorney
disqualification or mandatory withdrawal. Absent counsel's guid-
ance, a client is not likely to comprehend that, even where the
interests of the client and the commonly interested party later be-
come adverse, the attorney maintains certain obligations to the
commonly interested party that may then conflict with the client's
interests. The attorney's ability to render loyal, diligent, and inde-
pendent representation at a later time may then be materially
compromised, forcing the attorney to withdraw his or her repre-
sentation of the client.
Returning to the earlier hypothetical, for example, a situation
could arise where, through the common interest arrangement
concerning its suit against Xylon, Acme discloses to Beta certain
confidential trade information concerning the formula that Acme
applies to value undeveloped land. In later litigation against Acme,
this information disclosed by Acme would be useful to Beta; Attor-
ney Bellows, however, would be ethically prohibited from utilizing
the information he received from Acme, his pseudo-client, al-
though it is in the best interests of his client for him to disclose
that information. This situation would require Attorney Bellows to
withdraw as Beta's counsel because his obligations to Acme prevent
him from providing diligent and loyal legal advice to Beta.
Attorney withdrawal may have a significant adverse impact on a
client's interests. Specifically, attorney withdrawal or disqualifica-
tion deprives a client of his choice of counsel. Courts across
jurisdictions recognize that, in most circumstances, parties main-
tain the right to choose their counsel. 3 Depriving a client of his or
her choice of counsel can result in great harm to the client,'37 for
example, by preventing a client from using the services of its long-
time counsel who has become familiar with the practices of the
client.
136. See, e.g., Macheca Transp. Co. v. Phila. Indem. Ins., 463 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir.
2006) (quoting Banque Arabe et Internationale d'Investissement v. Ameritrust Corp., 690 F.
Supp. 607, 613 (S.D. Ohio 1988)); Cole v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 366 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004);
City of Kalamazoo v Michigan Disposal Serv. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222-23 (W.D. Mich.
2000), aff'd 151 F. Supp. 2d 913 (W.D. Mich. 2001); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 993 E Supp. 241,254 (D.N.J. 1998).
137. Cole, 366 F.3d at 817 ("[A] counsel's wrongful disqualification, which cannot be
immediately appealed, can cause great harm to a litigant."); Essex Chem. Corp., 993 E. Supp.
at 254 (characterizing such deprivation as a "grave disservice to the affected client"); King &
Patterson, supra note 13, at 12-13.
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Under any circumstances, the withdrawal of counsel familiar
with the client and the issues will adversely affect the client, but it
could critically harm the client's case if the withdrawal was re-
quired at a critical stage of representation. 138 Additionally, an
attorney's obligation of diligence demands that a lawyer accept
representation only where she believes that she can carry out the
representation to its conclusion; 13 to accept representation that an
attorney did not believe that she could carry out to its conclusion
would leave her client in a lurch, scrambling for substitute repre-
sentation in the middle of litigation. Because a common interest
arrangement risks creating a conflict of ethical obligations owed by
an attorney to her client and to a pseudo-client, entry into a com-
mon interest arrangement increases the risk of mandatory
withdrawal from representation. Thus, the possibilities of attorney
disqualification or withdrawal represent significant risks posed by
the common interest doctrine. An attorney's failure to adequately
discuss these possibilities with her client could also render any con-
sent to enter a common interest arrangement uninformed.
IV. EYES WIDE OPEN: INFORMED CONSENT
THROUGH COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Until more uniformity develops in the law of common interests,
there is no quick or easy fix to the ethical dilemmas created by the
common interest doctrine. Because contract language cannot pre-
vent the imposition of ethical or fiduciary duties under a common
interest agreement,1 40 the most obvious solution is simply not reli-
able at this time. The only way to protect an attorney and her client
at the outset is to open her client's eyes to the risks of the common
interest doctrine and to obtain the client's informed consent.
To diligently address the ethical issues raised through informal
aggregation, an attorney must first obtain the client's informed
consent 41 to waive not only confidentiality, but also some degree of
138. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 29; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 32.
139. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 4 (2003) ("[A] lawyer should carry
through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client.").
140. See supra Part II.B.3.
141. "'Informed consent' denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of
conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about
the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of con-
duct." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2003).
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diligence and loyalty as well. 42 To participate in a common interest
arrangement in which the members will exchange confidential in-
formation, the attorney must obtain the client's informed consent
to disclose confidential information or his implied authorization to
such disclosure. 43 Given the important role of the duty of confi-
dentiality, an attorney is obligated to not only personally keep
information confidential, but also to act in a manner to protect the
information from disclosure by others.
14
To adequately inform the client, an attorney should also counsel
the client on the risks associated with waiving a conflict limiting the
attorney's duty of confidentiality.4 5 The most obvious risk posed by
the common interest doctrine to the client's entitlement to confi-
dentiality is that the client may be precluded from asserting the
attorney-client privilege against the pseudo-client should the two
later become embroiled in litigation adverse to one another.14' Ad-
ditionally, an attorney should explain both the risk to the client's
confidentiality that is presented by the attorney's obligation to di-
vulge confidential information to the pseudo-client under the
common interest agreement, and the attorney's obligation not to
divulge confidential information received from the pseudo-
client.
147
The risks to the client's entitlement to diligence, loyalty, and in-
dependent judgment are significant in a common interest
arrangement. To honor the duty of loyalty and to protect the law-
yer-client relationship, an attorney must identify such existing or
potential conflicts of interest before accepting the representation
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 18 ("When representation of multi-
ple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications
of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the
attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved.").
143. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003). See supra note 141 for further
discussion of informed consent.
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16.
145. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 30 ("A particularly important factor
in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-lawyer
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege,
the prevailing rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not
attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privi-
lege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised.");
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 31 ("The lawyer should, at the outset of the
common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed con-
sent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to
withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be
kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to pro-
ceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed,
that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential.").
146. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmL 30.
147. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 31.
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of a client or as early as such potential conflict arises. 148 To prospec-
tively waive a conflict of interest, a client must understand the
identity of the potentially adverse party, the nature of any potential
dispute, and the effect of the waiver on the client's interests. 149 Of
course, the attorney must first determine that such a potential con-
flict created between the interests of the client and the pseudo-client
is consentable, meaning that the attorney can ethically obtain a
client's informed consent waiving the conflict. The test for consent-
ability requires that the attorney be able to conclude that he or she
will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to the
client, that the representation is permitted by law, and that the rep-
resentation does not involve directly adverse claims between two
clients in the same proceeding')' Should the attorney be limited in
her ability to diligently and independently pursue her client's in-
terests because of the conflict between her duties to the client and
her obligations to the pseudo-client, the attorney's loyalty to the
client may be directly challenged and the client may feel betrayed.
The attorney, therefore, must fully explain this risk to her client
and obtain his consent before entering into a common interest
arrangement."'
148. Where a conflict of interest exists before an attorney accepts a client's representa-
tion, the attorney must either obtain the client's informed consent to the conflict or decline
the representation. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 3. Where a conflict of
interest does not manifest until after an attorney accepts the representation, the same rules
apply-the attorney must either obtain the client's informed consent or withdraw his or her
representation. MODEL RULES OF PEOF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 4. If the conflict involves
more than one client, then the lawyer must determine whether he or she can continue to
represent either client; such a determination turns on whether the attorney can honor his
or her duties to the clients. Id.
149. City of Kalamazoo v. Michigan Disposal Serv. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 219, 243 (WD.
Mich. 2000), aff'd 151 F. Supp. 2d 913 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
150. MODEL RULES OF PEOF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1)-(3). See infra note 151 for further
discussion of consentability.
151. The Model Rules contemplate the simultaneous representation of parties with
common interests, provided that the provisions of Model Rule 1.7 concerning consent are
met. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 23. An attorney may continue to repre-
sent a client despite the existence of a conflict of interest as long as the conflict is
consentable and the client gives his or her informed consent in writing. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) & cmt. 14. A conflict of interest is consentable if the attorney
reasonably believes that he or she can provide competent and diligent legal representation
to the client, the representation is permitted by law, and the representation does not involve
directly adverse claims between two clients in the same proceeding. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (1)-(3). The purpose behind rendering certain conflicts nonconsentable
is to protect clients from consenting to proceed despite a conflict so limiting that an attor-
ney could not provide competent and diligent representation. MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 15. If a conflict is nonconsentable, then the attorney must either de-
cline representation not yet undertaken or withdraw from representation already accepted.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(2). If a conflict is consentable. then an attor-
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Finally, it is imperative that counsel explain the risks of future
disqualification or attorney withdrawal should the common parties
later become adverse; to ignore this issue is to put the client at
great risk of losing counsel's services at a critical time. As explained
above, should any of the potential conflicts between an attorney's
duties to her client and a pseudo-client materially compromise her
ability to render loyal, diligent, and independent representation,
counsel would be required to withdraw her representation. 15 2 This
may adversely affect the client by limiting his right to choose his
own counsel and by potentially harmfully disrupting representa-
tion at a crucial stage.'15 An attorney, therefore, must explain the
risks to her continued representation, as well as to her ability to
maintain the client's interests as paramount, posed by a common
interest arrangement prior to entering into such an arrangement.
Along with these risks, the attorney must explain the advantages
inherent in a common interest arrangement. One such advantage
of a common interest arrangement is the avoidance of duplicating
efforts and costs to reach the same end. This is coupled by the ad-
vantage of gaining confidential information held by another party
to the common interest arrangement to use to the client's own ad-
vantage. Additionally, the length of pretrial litigation may be
substantially reduced by avoiding the duplication of efforts
through information-sharing. This, in turn, streamlines litigation
to the benefit of all parties, as well as the court.
54
The costs and benefits of employing the common interest doc-
trine will vary from case to case and will turn on the specific
circumstances of each client. For example, a small client may have
a closer relationship with his attorney than a larger corporation
might; thus, the small client may be less likely to forego the future
sacrifice of his choice of counsel. A small client may also feel
harder hit than a larger corporate client were his attorney forced
to withdraw at a critical stage of representation because the smaller
client may have fewer resources or contacts to enable him to obtain
substitute counsel quickly. On the other hand, a large corporation
may recognize a greater likelihood that future litigation will put
counsel in a position where she must withdraw from representing
the client-because some conflict exists between the duties she owes
to the client and those that she may owe to the pseudo-client-than
ney may proceed with the representation after obtaining the client's informed consent to
the conflict. Id.
152. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of attorney withdrawal.
153. See supra Part Ill.B for a discussion of attorney withdrawal.
154. See supra Part IL.A for a detailed discussion of the advantages of the common in-
terest doctrine.
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the likelihood that an individual would be involved in future litiga-
tion adverse to the currently commonly interested party.
Returning to the earlier hypothetical, for example, it seems
quite probable that Acme and Beta, as real estate developers in the
same city, may become adverse parties in the fuiture. They may
compete over the rights to develop the same tract of land, for ex-
ample. This likelihood is increased because both parties to this
common interest agreement are sophisticated businesses conduct-
ing similar transactions in the same municipality. This increased
likelihood of future adversity increases the likelihood that Attorney
Bellows, having received confidential information from Acme
through the current common interest arrangement, will be forced
to withdraw his representation of Beta in future litigation against
Acme. This probability must factor into the balancing of the risks
and benefits of entering a common interest arrangement.
On the other hand, the risk of future withdrawal is very low in a
different hypothetical where Attorney Arnot instead represents Ms.
Adleigh, an individual seeking damages from Delco Pharmaceuti-
cals for injuries sustained when she ingested Sleepalot, a drug
manufactured by Delco, and Attorney Bellows represents Mr.
Benedict, an individual seeking similar damages from Delco. Be-
cause the parties to the common interest agreement in this
hypothetical are individuals whose only tie is that they were injured
by taking the same medication, the risk of future litigation in
which Ms. Adleigh and Mr. Benedict are adverse is relatively low.
Thus, it is much less likely that Attorney Bellows would be put in a
situation where the confidential information he receives from Ms.
Adleigh can be used to Mr. Benedict's advantage in later litigation,
under which circumstances, he would be forced to withdraw as Mr.
Benedict's counsel.
A client's decision based on a fully disclosed presentation of the
costs and benefits of entering a common interest arrangement is
unimportant from the perspective of informed consent. It is the act
of thus informing the client, not the outcome, that is essential.
Such a presentation will serve to protect not only the client's inter-
ests, but also the interests of the attorney who must rely on the
client's consent before abdicating her ethical duties to the client.
V. CONCLUSION
Independent of the continuing debate to define the relationship
and duties owed by an attorney to a member of a common interest
group, it is clear that a strong potential may exist for a future con-
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flict of interest to develop between commonly interested parties
which would materially limit an attorney's ability to deliver legal
representation with the diligence and loyalty to which every client
is entitled. The consequence of such a development may be the
material limitation of a client's ability to choose his or her counsel.
Thus, an attorney cannot ethically enter into a common interest
arrangement without violating her duties to her original client
unless she explicitly addresses all the material risks posed to the
client by such common representation and the client consents to
the arrangement.

